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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper analyzes the effects of political and economic institutions on efficiency of 
transition economies over the 1995-2005 period. Perpetual Inventory Method is used to 
construct capital series for these countries, and then stochastic production frontier analysis is 
used to estimate the efficiency scores and effects of institutions at the same time. The 
empirical results show that better institutions are associated with higher efficiency. However, 
all else equal, the transition countries in East Asia are more efficient than Central and Eastern 
European or Former Soviet Union transition countries. 
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 I. Introduction 
 
The significant role of institutions in determining growth has been confirmed in many 
studies. Barro (1991) shows that growth rate is positively associated with political stability 
and inversely related to a proxy1 of market distortions. Mauro (1995) concludes that 
bureaucratic efficiency causes high investment and growth. Rodrik’s (2000) study on 90 
countries over 1970-1989 leads to a conclusion that the more democratic a country is the 
smaller the variance of its long run growth. In addition, the effect of institutions on growth is 
not just to promote capital accumulation as Knack and Keefer (1995) reveal that it is still 
significant after controlling for factor accumulation and policy. This suggests that institutions 
should be an important determinant of productivity and efficiency. 
The purpose of this paper is to investigate the effect of institutions on efficiency in the 
context of transition economies. Since the fall of the socialist system, former socialist 
countries have undergone a transformation process from a centrally planned economy to a 
market-based economic system. We have observed marked difference in economic 
performance of these economies. In Eastern Europe and Central Asia, almost all of transition 
countries experienced sharp output fall in the early 1990s and then went through a recovery 
process with positive growth rates. At the same time in East Asia China, Vietnam and 
Cambodia managed to grow at high and steady rates.  
While factor accumulation certainly plays an important part in explaining growth, 
differences in efficiency also matter, especially when a lot of “creative destruction” is taking 
place. For many transition countries the problem is more about utilizing existing factors 
efficiently than about accumulating them. We can say that they have been operating below the 
production possibility frontier (PPF) and it will take them a while to get to the level of 
efficiency attained in advanced economies. Moreover, due to differences in initial conditions, 
the speed of transition and socio-economic settings, we can expect large variation in 
efficiency level of these countries. 
During the transition process, different institutional settings, both political and 
economic, have emerged in these countries. As noted in Murrell (2003), institutional quality 
in transition economies in general has improved quickly. However, there is a huge divergence 
in the levels of institutional development. Kaufmann et al. (2005) show that countries like 
Czech Republic, Slovakia and Poland have institutional quality that is in many aspects 
                                                 
1 The deviation from the sample mean of the purchasing power parity for investment in 1960. 
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comparable to those of developed countries while other countries continue to lag far behind. 
Therefore, the experience of transition countries in terms of recovering from a disrupted 
system and building necessary institutions for a market economy can be viewed as something 
close to a natural experiment for analyzing the effect of institutions on growth in general and 
improvement in efficiency in particular. 
Theoretically, there are many channels through which institutions can affect economic 
growth and efficiency. Democratic regimes with check and balance mechanisms are better 
able to curb corruption and prevent misuse of productive resources, especially in investment 
activities involving public funds, which is good for growth and efficiency. Sandholtz and 
Koetzle (2000) find that corruption is lower when democratic norms and institutions are 
stronger. In an effort to explain corruption Treisman (2000) also concludes that democracy 
reduces corruption though it is well established democracy rather than recent democratization 
process that matters (Sung (2004) also comes to similar conclusion). Good institutions can 
encourage accumulation of physical capital, human capital and technological knowledge and 
these factors in turn help improve efficiency. Bevan et al. (2004) finds that development of 
legal institutions has positive effect on FDI inflows to transition countries in Europe, which is 
supposed to bring in more advanced technologies to local economies and help enhance their 
efficiency. In addition, economic freedom is found by Dawson (1998), among others, to affect 
growth directly via total factor productivity and indirectly through investment. 
Though there have been many studies on the relationship between institutions and 
growth there are very few attempts to relate efficiency to institutions, especially in the 
transition context. Monorey and Lovell (1997) compare the efficiency of 17 Western 
European market economies and that of 7 Eastern European planned economies. With a 
dummy variable to identify planned economies, their research shows that over the period 
1978-1980 the Eastern European planned economies were only about three fourths as efficient 
as the Western European market economies. Using a panel of more than 70 countries over the 
period 1975-1990, economic freedom measures compiled by James Gwartney, Robert 
Lawson and Walter Block and stochastic frontier analysis, Adkins et al. (2002) show that 
increase in economic freedom leads to higher efficiency. However, two measures of political 
freedom, namely civil liberties and political rights taken from the Freedom House Index, are 
not significant in their model. In an attempt to test the relationship between governance, as 
reported in Kaufmann et al. (1999), and technical efficiency, Meon and Weill (2005) find that 
for a sample of 62 countries in 1990 better governance, especially government efficiency, is 
associated with greater technical efficiency.  
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To the best of our knowledge, there has not been any research that digs into the 
relationship between institution and efficiency in transition economies since the collapse of 
the Soviet Bloc. Perhaps it is because of the lack of data about institutions, capital and labour 
in these countries.  One of the contributions of this paper is to estimate capital series for these 
countries from gross investment data using the Perpetual Inventory Method. Then, following 
Battese and Coelli (1995), stochastic frontier analysis is used to estimate the efficiency and 
effect of institutions on efficiency at the same time by maximum likelihood technique. 
The next section presents an overview of the literature on stochastic frontier analysis 
and the specification of the production and efficiency functions. It will be followed by 
description of data in Section III and empirical results in Section IV. Section V will conclude 
the paper.  
 
II. The stochastic frontier analysis and the modelling of efficiency  
 
1. Stochastic frontier model 
 
The stochastic frontier production function was independently developed by Aigner, 
Lovell and Schmidt (1977) and Meeusen and van den Broeck (1977). Many researchers have 
used the model to estimate technical inefficiency for comparing efficiencies of firms or 
economies. Technical efficiency is defined as the ratio of observed output over the maximum 
feasible output (the frontier) given the level of inputs. For a panel data analysis with i as 
producer identifier and t as time period, the technical efficiency is depicted as: 
 ( ) ( ) ;; expitit itit it
yTE TE
f x vβ 1= ≤  (1)    
In equation (1.1), itx is a (1 x k) vector of inputs, β is a (k x 1) vector of coefficients to 
be estimated; are random errors that are assumed to be independently and identically 
distributed as
itv
2(0, )vN σ . The is stochastic element of the production function that capture 
random shocks to each producer/country. So the production frontier model will look like:  
itv
 ( ) ( ); .exp .it it it ity f x v TEβ=  (2) 
Let and assume thatexp( )it itTE u= − ( );itf x β takes the log-linear Cobb-Douglas form 
the stochastic production frontier model becomes  
 ,ln lnit o k k it it it
k
y xβ β v u= + + −∑  (3) 
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In equation (1.3) uit is the measure of inefficiency because the higher the uit the lower 
the TEit. Equation (1.3) is a linear regression model with a composite error it it itv uε = − where 
vit is the two-sided stochastic error and uit is the nonnegative inefficiency term. Because 
 we have uit≥0 and the composite error 1itTE ≤ itε is asymmetric. Therefore, OLS estimation 
can not provide a consistent estimate of 0β . Moreover, OLS can not provide estimates of uit 
which are central to efficiency analyses. In the standard efficiency literature, the frontier 
equation is estimated by maximum likelihood techniques with assumptions about distribution 
of vit and uit and uit are extracted from the composite error. 
Early attempts2 to explain efficiency effects adopt two-stage approach, in which 
efficiency scores are estimated in the first stage and then regressed against some explanatory 
variables in the second. However, the assumption of identical distribution of uit in the first 
stage is violated in the second stage which is usually OLS estimation. Battese and Coelli 
(1995) propose a model for technical inefficiency effects in a stochastic frontier function for 
panel data. The stochastic frontier and the inefficiency functions are estimated simultaneously 
by maximum likelihood. The panel specification of the model is as follows: 
 it it it ity x v uβ= + −  (4)   
where with i = 1, …, N and t =1, …, T; is the logarithm of the output for country i in 
period t, 
ity
itx is a vector of inputs (in log), and β is a vector of unknown parameters to be 
estimated. vit is assumed to be iid N(0, σv2) random error and distributed independently of uit. 
Technical inefficiency uit is a non-negative random variable assumed to be independently 
distributed such that uit is obtained by truncation (at zero) of the normal distribution 
2( ,it uN z )δ σ . In another word, the technical inefficiency effect uit is modelled as: 
   it it itu z wδ= +        (5) 
where the random error wit is assumed to follow normal distribution N(0,σ2) truncated at such 
a point that ≥0; the is a vector of explanatory variables associated with technical 
inefficiency and
itu itz
δ is a vector of unknown coefficients to be estimated.  
The maximum likelihood estimation of the model’s coefficients is facilitated by 
Battese and Corra (1977) parameterization, 2 2v
2
uσ σ σ= +  and 2 2 2/( )u v uγ σ σ σ= +  and they are 
estimated by the software Frontier 4.1 (Coelli, 1996). σ2 is the sum of variances of the 
stochastic error and the inefficiency term and γ is the ratio of variance of the inefficiency term 
over the total variance. If γ is significant we can say that the inefficiency matters and we can 
model the inefficiency. 
                                                 
2 Pitt and Lee (1981), Kalirajan and Shand (1986). 
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2. Specification of production function and modelling of efficiency 
 
In stochastic frontier analysis, specification of production function is important 
because efficiency is measured against an estimated frontier. If the frontier function is 
misspecified the conclusion about the dynamics or determination of efficiency may be wrong. 
The Cobb-Douglas production function is widely used in the literature on economic growth. 
However, there have been several studies which test the validity of the Cobb-Douglas 
specification. Based on a panel of 82 countries over a 28-year period, Duffy and 
Papageorgiou (2000) find that Cobb-Douglas can be rejected in favour of a more general CES 
specification. In theory, Cobb-Douglas is not as good as translog function since translog is a 
good first order approximation of many different types of functions with Cobb-Douglas as a 
special case. In another attempt to examine Cobb-Douglas specification with the presence of 
technical inefficiency with the same data set as the above, Kneller and Stevens (2003) also 
rejects Cobb-Douglas vis-à-vis the translog function.  
In this paper, we will also estimate the production frontier with both translog and 
Cobb-Douglas technologies. The production frontier equations are: 
(i) Cobb-Douglas: 0 1 2 3it it it it ity k l t v uβ β β β= + + + + −     (6) 
(ii) Translog: 2 20 1 2 3 4 5 6it it it it it it it it ity k l k l k l t vβ β β β β β β= + + + + + + + −u   (7) 
Here, is the logarithm of output for country i at time t, k is the logarithm of capital 
stock and l is the logarithm of labour. The time trend (t) is added to account for movement in 
the frontier (Kneller and Stevens, 2003). 
ity
To examine the effect of institutions on efficiency, the inefficiency term is 
modelled as a function of the degree of economic freedom as proxied by the Index of 
Economic Freedom (IEF), which is developed by the Heritage Foundation, and levels of 
Political Rights (PR) and Civil Liberties (CL) published by the Freedom House. The average 
value of PR and CL is collectively called Freedom House Index (FHI) .To account for 
systematic changes of efficiency over time, a time trend is also added to efficiency effect 
model. Time trend has been found significant in some efficiency analyses (see Kneller and 
Stevens (2003) for example).  
itu
Svejnar (2002) observes that the Central and Eastern and European countries had 
smaller output declines and could reverse the decline earlier than the countries of the 
Commonwealth of Independent States. At the same time, Eastern Asian transition economies 
did not suffer from recession and have had high growth rates. It seems there are regional 
characteristics that should be picked up by regional dummies. Therefore, three dummies are 
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generated and added to the efficiency model to account for potential region-specific effects 
for Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and East 
Asia (EA)3. In general, the technical efficiency function will look like this: 
0 1 2 3 4it it it i itu IEF FHI RD time wδ δ δ δ δ= + + + + +      (8) 
with RDi being either CEE, CIS or EA, with CEE used as control group. 
 
  
III. Data  
 
This research uses a panel of 28 transition economies over the 1995-2005 period. The 
selection of countries and time period is mainly on the basis of data availability. 1995 is the 
year when the Index of Economic Freedom data was first available. Two types of data that 
need detailing are input-output data and measures of institutions. 
1. Input-output data 
 
The growth and efficiency literature usually uses either the World Bank’s STARS 
dataset4 or Summer and Heston’s dataset (Penn World Table). However, these datasets do not 
include all transition countries. So for the purpose of this research we use the World Bank 
Development Indicators (WBDIs) for output (GDP), gross investment and labour. Output is 
total GDP converted to 2000 constant US dollar at official exchange rate. The data on labour 
is the total labour force in the relevant countries. 
Since capital stock data are not available for all countries in the sample in any existing 
databases, the transition countries’ investment series (gross capital formation) are used to 
construct capital series by applying the Perpetual Inventory Method. According to the 
method, the capital stock evolves as follows: 
1(1 )t t tK I Kδ −= + − ,       (9) 
with δ being the depreciation rate of capital. 
By rearranging (7) we obtain: 
1
t
t
IK
g δ− = + ,       (10) 
where g is the growth rate of the capital stock which is assumed to be equal the average of 
GDP growth rates over the estimation period.  
                                                 
3 CIS countries include Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Estonia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Latvia, 
Lithuania. 
4 developed by two World Bank researchers V. Nehru and A. Dhareshwar (1993). 
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 Selecting the correct depreciation rate δ in calculating capital stocks is very important. 
If the rate is too high capital accumulation will be low and productivity growth will be 
overestimated and vice versa. In the growth literature one depreciation rate is often applied 
across the whole sample of countries, be they developed or developing countries (4% in 
Nehru and Dhareshwar (1993) and 7% in Easterly and Rebelo (1993)). However, depreciation 
rates applied to developed and developing countries should be different because investment 
projects in developing countries are normally not as efficient as those in developed countries. 
That is not to mention corruption which is more pronounced in developing countries than in 
developed ones. Bu (2006) estimates depreciation rates from firm level data of some 
developing countries and finds them to be much higher than rates used in the above-cited 
growth and efficiency analyses. Prichett (2000) reports that over half of developing countries 
in the sample under investigation have negative total factor productivity. One possible 
explanation could be the overvaluation of capital which is equivalent to low depreciation rate. 
Therefore, in this paper the capital series are generated with a depreciation rate δ =10%5.  
Unfortunately, we unable to compare our capital series with existing ones because they are 
only available for pre-1990 periods6 but we do not have investment series for most of 
transition countries (all but China and Hungary) to estimate capital stock before 1990. 
 
2. Measures of institutions 
  
Many researchers of institutional economics use the Fraser Institute’s Economic 
Freedom Index constructed by James D. Gwartney, Robert A. Lawson and J. R. Clark7. 
However, this dataset does not cover all transition countries8 and before 2000 it was only 
available for every five years. In this paper we use the Index of Economic Freedom data 
developed by the Heritage Foundation and the Wall Street Journal. The dataset starts from 
1995 and is available for all transition countries. The authors of the Index collect 50 
independent economic variables that are categorized into ten economic freedom factors (IFE 
factors): trade policy, fiscal burden or government, government intervention, monetary policy, 
capital flows and foreign investment, banking and finance, wages and prices, property rights, 
regulation and informal market. The difference between this data set and others is that the 
                                                 
5 For robustness check 6% depreciation rate is also used to generate another capital series but the main 
estimation results do not change (see Table A.3). 
6 1950-1988 in Penn World Table 5.6 (capital series not available in later version) and 1950-1990 in World Bank 
dataset. 
7 Gwartney et al., 1999. 
8 only 21 transition countries (19 Central and Eastern  European countries and two East Asian countries). 
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values of the variables are calculated with data available from various sources9 which are less 
subject to subjective survey data. Each factor is graded from 1 to 5, with a score of 1 
representing an economic environment that is the most conducive to economic freedom. Table 
A.1 in the Appendix shows the correlation matrix of these ten factors. The Fraser Institute’s 
Economic Freedom Index and the Heritage Foundation’s Index of Economic Freedom are 
highly correlated with an coefficient of 0.810. 
So far, many institution researchers have used the composite indexes such as the index 
of governance published by Daniel Kaufmann and his co-authors, the Gwartney et al.’s 
Economic Freedom Index (Fraser Institute) or the Heritage Foundation’s Index of Economic 
Freedom in their empirical researches but there have been doubts about their consistency and 
relevance. Berggren (2002) observes that the Gwartney et al.’s index has different 
components and is constructed with different weighting schemes from one year to another. 
Heckelman and Stroup (2005) suggest that empirical researchers should use individual 
economic freedom indicators instead of the aggregate indexes because misinterpretation may 
arise with regard to different types of economic freedom.  
To avoid using the composite index we apply the Principal Component Analysis to the 
ten IEF factors and select some principal components as measures of economic freedom. This 
technique can help reduce the dimensionality of the original data while retaining the 
maximum variation of the underlying variables. The principal components, by construction, 
are independent of each other. The parallel analysis and the Velicer’s minimum average 
partial correlation analysis for selecting number of components to be retained indicate that we 
should use two components. As a result, economic institutions in this paper will be 
represented by the first two principal components (COMP1 and COMP2). 
Table A.2 in the Appendix is the loading matrix of the principal component analysis 
and the cumulative variance that is explained by variances of components. It tells about the 
importance of principal individual components how they are related to the underlying 
variables. The first component, which by construction has the highest variance, can be 
interpreted as a general measure of freedom. The variance of the first component explains 
50.5% of the total variance of the 10 factors. The second component is positively correlated 
with fiscal policy, government intervention and monetary policy and negatively correlated 
with foreign investment, property rights and regulation. We can think of the second 
component as a contrast between macroeconomic policy and business-related policy. High 
scores on this component is associated with less freedom in terms of macroeconomic 
                                                 
9 See Beach and Miles (2006) for details. 
10 Note that for the Fraser Institute’s index, the higher the score the more freedom there is. 
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environment and more freedom in the business environment. Between the first two 
components they explain 64.3% of the total variance of all factors. 
As for political institutions two measures are widely used in the literature: civil 
liberties (CL) and political rights (PR). These measures are published by the Freedom House 
which uses surveys and assessment reports to evaluate the actual rights and freedoms enjoyed 
by individuals. PR and CL are scored from one to seven for each country in each year with 
larger number indicating less freedom. PR and CL are highly correlated (0.94) in this sample. 
In the actual estimations, a simple average index of them (FHI) is also used (estimations with 
PR and CL used separately are reported in the Annex – Table A.2). 
 
Table 1: Summary statistics for 28 countries, 1995-2005 
Variable Mean Standard deviation Minimum Maximum 
y 23.29174 1.647378 20.51851 28.26483 
k 23.76579 1.759886 20.49101 29.02706 
l 15.32429 1.507875 13.40378 20.46972 
FHI 3.805195 1.977736 1 7 
PR 3.75 2.264116 1 7 
CL 3.86039 1.745162 1 7 
COMP1 -4.74E-09 2.24695 -5.68623 4.741608 
COMP2 5.13E-10 1.176851 -2.69015 2.418832 
Note: y, k and l are logarithms of output, capital and labour; FHI is the simple average index of Political Rights 
(PR) and Civil Liberties (CL); COMP1 and COMP2 are the first two principal components of ten economic 
freedom factors 
 
 
IV. Empirical results and discussions 
 
Both Translog and Cobb-Douglas production functions are estimated with the final 
efficiency model being: 
0 1 2 3 4 51 2it it it it i itu COMP COMP FHI RD timeδ δ δ δ δ δ= + + + + + +ε   (11) 
 Regressions are run with one regional dummy separately and with CEE as control 
group but only the EA dummy is significant. PR, CL and the simple average of them (FHI) 
are used separately in the regressions but there are no qualitative changes. Changes in terms 
of coefficients’ magnitude are not substantial. Table 2 presents the result with FHI as measure 
of political freedom, with and without and EA - dummy for East Asia (see Table A.2 for 
results with PR and CL). 
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Table 2. 
Estimation result with FHI 
 Translog 
without regional 
dummy (1) 
Cobb-Douglas 
without regional 
dummy (2) 
Translog with EA 
dummy (3)  
CD with EA 
dummy (4) 
Production frontier     
Constant 9.23** (2.68) 10.00*** (19.99) 10.25** (3.58) 10.58*** (21.69) 
k -0.46* (-1.86) 0.1*** (13.87) -0.65** (-3.01) 0.09*** (12.18) 
l 1.18** (4.51) 0.76*** (24.24) 1.35*** (8.4) 0.73*** (22.86) 
k2 0.03*** (30.13) - 0.03*** (34.28) - 
l2 -0.02 (-1.22) - -0.03** (-2.7) - 
kl -0.01 (-0.82) - -0.001 (-0.9) - 
time -0.02** (-4.0) 0.03** (2.92) -0.02*** (-5.12) 0.03** (2.91) 
Efficiency effects     
Constant -34.86*** (-40.6) -44.14*** (-15.01) -33.68*** (-26.59) - 51.27*** (-20.67) 
COMP1 1.23*** (9.61) 0.81** (4.89) 0.82** (3.86) 0.59** (2.43) 
COMP2 2.46*** (7.4) 13.8** (3.2) 1.48** (3.45) 0.96** (2.33) 
FHI 2.85*** (12.27) 5.3*** (12.19) 3.68*** (13.02) 6.7*** (17.74) 
EA dummy -  - - 15.82*** (-12.77) -7.8*** (-6.57) 
time 1.1*** (11.81) 0.89*** (7.9) 0.79*** (5.46) 0.86*** (7.1) 
σ2 13.64*** (24.13) 19.41*** (10) 11.57*** (11.64) 25.12*** (10.66) 
γ 0.99*** (3423.1) 0.99*** (402.11) 0.99*** (3425.9) 0.99*** (715.15) 
Log likelihood  -195.73 -419.4  -181.75 -414.3  
Likelihood ratio test 845.86 425.4 873.82 435.6 
Note: t-ratio in parenthesis; *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels.  
 
In all specifications the likelihood ratio test results show that the coefficients of the 
efficiency equation and σ2 and γ are jointly significant. This means the specification of the 
model is correct. The significance of the variance parameters σ2 (sum of variances) and γ 
(variance of inefficiency term over sum of variances) indicates that technical efficiency does 
matter in the production function and that the stochastic specification is appropriate. With γ 
being very close to one in all specifications we can say that variation in technical efficiency is 
substantial among transition economies.  
In efficiency analysis, it is important to have good specification of the production 
function since different technologies will result in different measures of efficiency. As 
mentioned in Section II the Cobb-Douglas technology has been rejected in several tests. Here, 
following the same line, specification tests are also done by calculating generalized likelihood 
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ratios and they show that translog models should be used in frontier and efficiency analyses 
for transition economies (the ratios are 447.4 and 465.2 for specification with and without EA 
dummy respectively).  
 The first important finding of this paper is the significance of economic and political 
freedoms in determining efficiency. In all the models presented in the Table 2, economic and 
political freedoms have positive and significant coefficients. Since uit in equation (9) is 
inefficiency (or distance from the frontier) and higher values of economic and political 
freedoms means less freedom, the positive coefficients can be interpreted as implying that 
higher level of freedom is associated with higher level of efficiency.  
 Empirically, the effect of democracy on growth and efficiency has been controversial 
in the literature. Minier (1998) finds that countries that democratized early growth faster than 
others who did not choose a democratic path. Barro (1996) reports a hump-shaped 
relationship between democracy and growth. When trying to disentangle the effect of 
democracy on growth Tavares and Wacziarg (2001) concludes that, overall, the negative 
effect of democracy is larger than the positive one. In Adkins et al. (2002) the Political Rights 
and Civil Liberties are not significant. Here they do turn out to be significant both through the 
composite index and on their own (Table A.3), even after the economic freedom has been 
controlled for. This is consistent with the result found in Meon and Weill (2005) for a larger 
set of countries that the rule of law and control of corruption are associated with higher 
efficiency. 
The second significant finding is that the coefficient of East Asia dummy is negative 
and significant. This means that East Asia’s transition economies on average, ceteris paribus, 
are more efficient than the Eastern European and Former Soviet Union countries in the 
sample. This empirical result may look counter-intuitive for some people since many Eastern 
European countries (Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland for example) have rather advanced 
production base vis-à-vis the East Asian ones. However, this result can manifest the fact that 
the Eastern European transition economies underwent an initial period of “disorganization” 
when the old production system was destroyed almost overnight and a new one has not been 
in place11. It takes time to build new business links, to employ new technology and to adjust 
production methods to market signals, especially when market was fledgling. At the same 
time China, Vietnam and, to a lesser extent, Cambodia had been experimenting with market 
economy for a while before the beginning of the period under study. The interesting point is 
that East Asian transition countries manage to use more efficiently the resources they have 
                                                 
11 Blanchard and Kremer (1997). 
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though they have less production capacity than Central and Eastern European ones in this 
period. 
Among the East Asian economies China was the first to reform and adopt market 
economy, though gradually. More importantly, China is a huge country and it has produced a 
remarkable growth rate since the beginning of its reform. Therefore there are reasons to 
believe that the East Asian effect is dominated by China and possibly only by China. To 
check if Cambodia and Vietnam also have the efficiency effect the model (3) in Table 2 is 
estimated again with a dummy for China and another one for Cambodia and Vietnam in the 
efficiency equation. The result is that are both significant (see Table A.4). Thus we can safely 
confirm that the three East Asian economies have higher efficiency than the other countries in 
the sample given the same level of production factors and institutions. All this said, it is worth 
mentioning that East Asian countries have less economic and political freedom on average 
(3.68 compared to 3.06 of CEE and 3.5 of FSU on aggregate EFI score; 6.39 compared with 
2.15 and 4.38 on FHI). 
 
V. Conclusion  
 
The role of institutions in economic growth and efficiency has been discussed widely 
in the literature. Though empirical results change from one measure of institution to another, 
or from one dataset to another there seems to be a general conclusion that institutions do have 
positive effects on growth and efficiency. Since the collapse of the Soviet Bloc the experience 
of transition economies has provided something akin to a natural experiment to test the effect 
of institutions on efficiency. Applying stochastic frontier analysis technique, this paper has 
confirmed the positive effects of economic and political institutions as measured by the Index 
of Economic Freedom (Heritage Foundation) and the Freedom House Index respectively. For 
28 transition economies over the period 1995-2005, more economic or political freedom is 
found to reduce the level of inefficiency. The empirical result for the effect of political 
freedom has been mixed but our paper shows that it does have significant role in improving 
efficiency, at least in the context of transition economies. Of course institutions do not solely 
determine efficiency but improvement of institutional quality should help transition 
economies to gain higher efficiency. The positive role of institutions found here is robust to 
different constructed measures of capital series (depreciation rates of 10% and 6%). 
Among these transition economies, the East Asian ones are, ceteris paribus, more 
efficient than others. Moreover, this effect is not wholly limited to China. This may be due to 
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the famous dual approach to reform and liberalization that was first initiated by China and 
then followed by Vietnam and Cambodia when they moved away from planned economy. 
 Though the issue of causality between institution and efficiency is controversial and 
the results obtained here are subject to questions, hopefully this paper will contribute to 
clearer understanding of the role of institutions, both economic and political. 
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Annex 
Table A.1 
Correlations of Indices of Economic Freedom (Heritage Foundation) 
 
 Trade Fiscal Gov_int Mon_pol For_inv Banking WP PROP REG INFMKT
Trade 1          
Fiscal 0.2402 1         
Gov_int 0.4318 0.2383 1        
Mon_pol 0.1572 0.2839 0.377 1       
For_inv 0.5549 0.2203 0.3653 0.1128 1      
Banking 0.5336 0.2719 0.4498 0.374 0.6935 1     
WP 0.4637 0.2387 0.4395 0.3724 0.7131 0.7082 1    
PROP 0.547 0.142 0.2782 0.0192 0.6907 0.6465 0.5394 1   
REG 0.5114 0.1133 0.2802 0.112 0.686 0.6166 0.6133 0.7947 1  
INFMKT 0.4629 0.1221 0.3875 0.2779 0.5447 0.5804 0.5393 0.6075 0.5294 1 
Note: Trade: trade policy; Fiscal: fiscal policy; Gov_int: government intervention; Mon_pol: 
monetary policy; For_inv: capital flows and foreign investment; Banking: banking and 
finance; WP: wages and prices; PROP: property rights; REG: regulation; and INF_MKT: 
informal market 
 
 
Table A.2 
Principal component loading matrix for Economic Freedom factors 
 
 Component 
Factor 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Trade policy 0.3173 -0.0304 0.1902 0.5506 0.182 0.6822 -0.2146 0.0856 -0.0844 -0.0016
Fiscal burden 0.1453 0.4527 0.8229 -0.1347 0.1491 -0.2153 0.0245 0.0651 -0.0561 -0.0464
Government 
consumption 0.2545 0.3719 -0.2087 0.6592 -0.2696 -0.417 0.2683 -0.0026 0.0164 -0.0014
Monetary policy 0.16 0.6411 -0.3547 -0.3297 0.1732 0.3709 0.2282 0.0794 0.2891 0.1393 
Foreign 
investment 0.3753 -0.175 0.1129 -0.0826 -0.3349 -0.0709 -0.3159 0.0664 0.7656 -0.0374
Banking and 
finance 0.3823 0.0629 -0.0534 -0.1741 -0.1205 0.0638 -0.0823 -0.8241 -0.2062 -0.2641
Wage and policy 0.3663 0.0792 -0.1186 -0.2658 -0.4359 -0.016 -0.3226 0.3825 -0.5186 0.2551
Property rights 0.3599 -0.3411 0.1002 -0.0406 0.2089 -0.0877 0.3841 -0.1672 0.0179 0.7178
Regulation 0.3574 -0.2935 0.0206 -0.161 -0.0323 0.0851 0.5843 0.3246 -0.0826 -0.5458
Informal market   0.3308 -0.0396 -0.278 -0.0093 0.6932 -0.3905 -0.36 0.1376 -0.0329 -0.1703
Cumulative 
variance 0.5049 0.6434 0.7264 0.7954 0.8476 0.8931 0.9321 0.9616 0.9838 1
 
 Table A.3 
Estimation result with Political Rights and Civil Liberties with translog production function 
 
 Translog without regional dummy Translog with EA dummy 
 PR CL PR CL 
Production frontier     
Constant 6.33** (1.91) 6.45 (1.81) 9.69*** (3.19) 11.48 (3.77) 
k -0.34 (-1.3) -0.29 (-1.13) -0.64** (-2.63) -0.74 (-3.06) 
l 136*** (7.08) 1.29*** (6.92) 1.41*** (8.86) 1.33 (8.07) 
k2 0.03*** (30.1) 0.03*** (30.38) 0.03*** (30.8) 0.03 (29.17) 
l2 -0.02 (-1.17) -0.01 (-0.93) -0.03** (-2.48) -0.04** (-2.72) 
kl -0.02 (-1.26) -0.02 (-1.38) -0.002 (-0.13) 0.005 (0.28) 
time -0.02*** (-4.2) -0.02*** (-4.93) -0.02*** (-4.01) -0.02*** (-5.16) 
Efficiency effects     
Constant -30.7*** (-21.8) -33.87*** (-18.49) -32.1*** (-20.63) -35.97*** (-18.52) 
COMP1 1.89*** (10.41) 1.05*** (5.65) 1.14*** (4.01) 0.23 (1.51) 
COMP2 3.7*** (7.6) 2.45*** (5.17) 2.1*** (4.6) 0.47 (1.59) 
PR 1.2** (2.94) - 2.69*** (5.1) - 
CL - 3.3*** (9.92)  4.72*** (12.67) 
EA dummy - - -13.49*** (-5.16) -17.15*** (-11.8) 
time  1.7*** (10.21) 1.13*** (10.23) 1.04*** (4.15) 0.69*** (8.2) 
σ2 12.72*** (12.42) 10.84*** (8.7) 12.73*** (13.35) 10.3*** (11.02) 
γ 0.99*** (3495.8) 0..99*** (3685.64) 0.99*** (3837.9) 0.99*** (2688.5) 
Log likelihood  -202.18 -184.48 -193.74 -168.59 
Likelihood ratio test 832.96 868.36 849.85 900.15 
Note: T-ratios in parenthesis 
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 Table A.4 
Translog production function with 10% and 6% depreciation rates, and with China (CHN)  
and Cambodia-Vietnam (CBD_VN) dummies 
  
 10% depreciation 6% depreciation 
Production frontier   
Constant 11.11*** (3.8) 47.28*** (47.51) 
k -0.73*** (-3.47) -2.22*** (-27.04) 
l 1.36*** (8.02) -0.72** (-3.46) 
k2 0.03** (30.61) 0.021*** (34.8) 
l2 -0.04** (-3.15) -0.07*** (-5.2) 
kl 0.004 (0.26) 0.12** (2.04) 
time -0.026*** (-3.76) -0.04*** (-68.6) 
Efficiency effect   
Constant -33.41*** (-28.54) -10.27*** (-12.47) 
COMP1 0.92*** (7.18) 0.58*** (5.24) 
COMP2 1.7*** (5.73) 2.79*** (8.71) 
FHI 3.59*** (14.99) 1.52*** (9.95) 
CHN -20.61** (-3.27) -1.91*** (-4.09) 
CBD_VN -14.81*** (-12.53) -5.19*** (-5.9) 
time 0.87*** (9.33) 0.31** (3.3) 
σ2 12.26*** (13.26) 3.97*** (22) 
γ 0.99*** (2966.5) 0.99 (0.98E+8) 
Log likelihood -182.29 -427.82 
Likelihood ratio test 871.4 382.57 
Note: t-ratio in parenthesis 
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